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US/EU OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT - SOME ISSUES
DR. RUWANTISSA ABEYRATNE*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HERE HAS BEEN some polarization in the discussions re-
garding the advantages and disadvantages of the open skies
negotiations between the United States and the European
Union ("EU"), particularly on the U.S. side. This divergence
has largely been due to the perennial dichotomy between inter-
ests of the legislature, which ensures national control of U.S.
airlines, and the aviation industry, which is regularly in the red
and is looking for openings to put U.S. airlines back on their
feet. Both manufacturers (such as Boeing) and airlines (such as
United Airlines) have claimed that the infusion of foreign capi-
tal in U.S. airlines could help bail domestic carriers out of finan-
cial instability. However, U.S. legislators have argued that an
open-skies agreement between the United States and the EU,
where it has been proposed by the EU that current U.S. restric-
tions on ownership and control of U.S. airlines, pegged at 25%
for foreigners, be relaxed, could have serious consequences and
could allow foreign interests to restructure the U.S. airline
industry.
It has been reported that U.S. Secretary of Transportation
Norman Y. Mineta stated that an open-skies agreement between
the United States and the EU would provide the United States
with a historic opportunity to increase travel, reduce fares, ex-
pand commerce, and bring the two continents closer together.'
He also noted that an agreement would provide airlines of both
the United States and the EU with opportunities for healthier
competition in a growing travel market and more connections
between cities and towns of all sizes on both sides of the Atlan-
* Coordinator, Air Transport Programs, International Civil Aviation
Organization. The author has written this article in his personal capacity.
I Open Skies: No Deal Better than a Bad Deal, COMMUNIQUt AIRPORT BUSINESS,
Sept. - Oct. 2004, at 28, 28.
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tic. 2 Additionally, Jeffrey N. Shane, U.S. Undersecretary for Pol-
icy at the Department of Transportation, appearing before the
Aviation Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infra-
structure Committee on February 8, 2006, underscored the fact
that, to continue to be effective, U.S. carriers required signifi-
cant capital investments in facilities, technology, and a variety of
commercial arrangements.' In this endeavor, the U.S. airlines
should have access to global capital markets as allowed by law.
Mr. Shane assured the Subcommittee that, while an open-skies
agreement between the United States and EU would enhance
the ability of U.S. airlines to compete and their potential to cre-
ate employment opportunities, it would by no means allow for
the amendment of the current ownership limits requiring 75%
of the voting stock in airlines to be owned by U.S. citizens.4 Fur-
thermore, Mr. Shane added that the president and two-thirds of
the board of directors and other managing officials would be
U.S. citizens and airline companies would remain under the
control of U.S. citizens.5
Mr. Shane went on to point out that the department has a
statutory mandate to foster a safe, healthy, and competitive air-
line industry that will remain capable of sustaining U.S. eco-
nomic growth by meeting the people's needs in transportation.6
He further stated that the Department of Transportation's Pro-
posed Notice of Rulemaking would also require reciprocity in that,
for a non-U.S. investor to enjoy the benefits of the flexibility that
would be available, U.S. investors would have equal opportunity
and right in the home country of the foreign investor.7 The
main point made by Mr. Shane was that there was well-estab-
lished policy in major industries such as financial services, auto-
mobile manufacturing, information technology, steel, and
pharmaceuticals allowing for capital to flow freely across borders
enabling competitors to establish a global market presence, ef-
fectively exploit economies of scope and scale, and respond to
customer demand.' The Department's proposal for U.S. air-
2 Id.
3 U.S. - EU Open Skies Agreement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H.
Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Jeffrey Shane, Undersec'y of Transp.).
4 Id. at 2.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 3.
7 Id. at 2
s Id. at 3-4.
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lines was along similar lines, placing maximum reliance on com-
petitive market forces in air transport.'
The apprehension of U.S. legislators regarding the possible
lack of control of U.S. airlines by U.S. citizens under an open-
skies agreement with the EU is not the only issue at stake for
both parties to the negotiations. There are other issues that this
article will address along with the ownership and control issue.
The Economic Briefing of the International Air Transport Asso-
ciation ("IATA"),° issued in February 2006, notes that over 2000
aircraft were ordered in 2005 from the two largest aircraft manu-
facturers-Airbus and Boeing." These large orders have been
placed despite the airline industry incurring an estimated net
loss of $6 billion in 2006.12 The main concern with such large
orders is that the injection of large capacity might adversely af-
fect price competition in the years to come.1 3 The only consola-
tion, however, is that the current trend of aircraft orders tends
to suggest a managed delivery schedule, which will compare fa-
vorably with the two previous peak cycles of 1991 and 1999.1"
Another encouraging fact is that a large number of aircraft will
be delivered to burgeoning markets in China and India, which
have already proven the need for more capacity in their markets
in the next five years.15
Still concerning, though, is the fact that orders from North
America and Europe are quite substantial, raising questions as
to whether a liberalized regime between the two great regions
across the Atlantic might result in capacity dumping and pricing
inconsistencies, particularly from 2007 when large orders are
9) Id. at 4.
10 IATA was formed in 1919 to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and
experiences gained during the pioneering years of international air transport.
Formally established in 1945, IATA is now an association of the airlines and rep-
resents them and watches out for their interests. The mission of IATA is to pro-
mote safe, reliable and secure air services for the benefit of the peoples of the
world; provide means of collaboration among airlines engaged directly or indi-
rectly in air transport; and cooperate with the International Civil Aviation Organ-
ization and other relevant organizations. See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO],
Manual on the Regulation of Int'l Air Transport, at 38-1, ICAO Doc. 9626 (2d ed.
2004) [hereinafter ICAO Doc. 9626].
1I MARK SMYTH, INT'L AIR TRANSP. ASS'N [IATA], IATA ECONOMICS BRIEFING:
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scheduled to be delivered. Of particular concern is that, in the
event demand growth in services takes a downward path, large-
scale new deliveries could force airlines to enter into cutthroat
price competition just as airlines are beginning to make a profit
in 2007.16 IATA acknowledges that the airline industry has not
shown much wisdom in the timing of new orders and delivery
dates and that the industry, being capital intensive, could there-
fore be adversely affected by the timing of orders and deliveries
which dictate profit and loss in the industry.1 7
It is against this backdrop that the United States and the Euro-
pean Union"8 have launched a new round of negotiations to-
ward open skies,19  calculated to bring about unfettered
competition among their airlines. The fundamental aim of the
US/EU negotiations is to do away with the existing tapestry of
bilateral air-services agreements between individual European
Union member States and the United States and set up one sys-
tem regulating transatlantic aviation. One of the issues on the
16 The estimates of IATA show net profits for the airlines of $6.5 billion in 2007
after incurring $46.4 billion of losses over the previous six years. Id. at 2.
17 Id. at 2.
18 The European Union or the EU is an intergovernmental and supranational
union of twenty-five European countries, known as member states. European
Union (last visited Feb. 24, 2007), Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eu-
ropeanUnion. Two new member states will join in 2007-Romania and Bulga-
ria. Id. The European Union was established under that name in 1992 by the
Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty). Id. However, many aspects
of the Union existed before that date through a series of predecessor relation-
ships, dating back to 1951. Id. The European Union's activities cover all areas of
public policy, from health and economic policy to foreign affairs and defense. Id.
However, the extent of its powers differs greatly between areas. Id. Depending
on the area in question, the EU may therefore resemble any one of the following:
a federation (for example, on monetary affairs, agricultural, trade and environ-
mental policy, economic and social policy); a confederation (for example, on
home affairs); or, an international organization (for example, in foreign affairs).
Id. A key activity of the EU is the establishment and administration of a common
single market, consisting of a customs union, a single currency (adopted by
twelve of the twenty-five member states), a common agricultural policy, a com-
mon trade policy, and a common fisheries policy. Id.
1( An open-skies agreement is defined as a type of agreement which, while not
uniformly defined by its various advocates, would create a regulatory regime that
relies chiefly on sustained market competition for the achievement of its air-ser-
vices goals and is largely or entirely devoid of a priori governmental management
of access rights, capacity and pricing, while having safeguards appropriate to
maintaining the minimum regulation necessary to achieve the goals of the agree-
ment. See ICAO Doc. 9626, supra note 10, at 2.2-2. Open-skies agreements are
believed to provide for more competition, lower prices, and higher passenger
volumes in markets between signatory nations. See id.
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table is cabotage rights, 20 particularly for European carriers who
cannot carry revenue passengers from point to point in the
United States. One offer by the United States has been the right
for European carriers to fly from anywhere in the EU to any
point in the United States. However, the United States has
sought in return beyond fifth-freedom rights (in other words,
the right for U.S. carriers to carry revenue passengers from a
European point to points beyond Europe) and vice versa of-
fered rights beyond the United States for European carriers.
Another key issue is ownership and control of carriers. Where
the United States limits foreign voting rights in its airlines to
25%, the EU has placed a ceiling at 49% foreign voting rights.21
The United States's compromise to this impasse has been to of-
fer global investors more flexibility in marketing, routing, and
fleet structures, while retaining the 25% cap on foreign invest-
ment in U.S. airlines. 22 The United States has categorically
stated that U.S. investment rules cannot and indeed will not be a
topic for negotiation.23 The increased leverage given to foreign
investors is meant to facilitate the influx of foreign capital by
airlines in the red, such as Delta, United, and Northwest Air-
lines, who are facing bankruptcy proceedings.
Despite the setbacks of its major carriers, the United States
has taken a courageous step towards liberalization in the belief
that deregulation has to continue and that liberalization of air
transport between the United States and Europe would result in
24 a uteincreased market share for U.S. carriers, as well as further
20 A cabotage right or cabotage privilege is a right or privilege granted to a
foreign State or foreign carrier to carry revenue traffic from one airport of a State
to another in the same contiguous territory of that State. See id. at 4.1-10.
21 See Colin Baker, Back to the Table, AIRLINE BUSINESS, Oct. 2005, at 36; see also
ICAO Doc. 9626, supra note 10.
22 Jeffrey N. Shane, Undersec'y of Transp., Aviation Deregulation: A Work in
Progress, Speech Before the Int'l Aviation Club (Nov. 8, 2005), in MOVING THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY, April 2005, at 7.
23 Id.
24 The effects of open skies agreements signed by the United States with Latin
American countries has been beneficial to U.S. carriers. A report released on
this subject in 2000 revealed that an open skies arrangement with these countries
is particularly advantageous for U.S. carriers. See THE IMPACT OF OPEN SKIES BE-
TWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA, 78 (available from AvMAN, 6355,
NW 36th St. Suite 601 Miami, Fl 33166). The study showed that from 1997 to
1998 the capacity of U.S. carriers in countries with open skies increased by 24.2%,
while local carriers boosted their capacity by only 12.3%. Id. Also, in the same
period, Origin-Destination ("OD") traffic between the United States and open-
skies countries in the region grew by 22.2%, while the same traffic rose only 3.5%
in countries without open skies. Id. The study mentions that market shares of
2007]
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strengthening already robust competition between North Amer-
ican carriers and their European counterparts. Jeffrey Shane,
Undersecretary for Policy at the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion, has categorically stated that aviation liberalization is not
"for the faint of heart, ' 25 and that a possible breakthrough to-
wards open skies between the United States and EU would bring
an entirely new level of liberalization to trans-Atlantic air ser-
vices. The United States believes that open skies and open-mar-
ket access for United States and EU carriers will not only bring
750 million people together, but will also create a template for
other regions of the world to follow26.
The United States claims that one of the issues on which both
parties are in agreement is that there should be service by every
European and every American carrier between all points in Eu-
rope and all points in the United States, 27 although the EU has
not confirmed this statement. 28 Broadly, the United States is
seeking the right for every U.S. carrier to fly from a European
Union member state to another European Union member State
and beyond to third countries, which essentially means that all
traffic restrictions currently in place at some major European
airports, including London Heathrow, should be lifted.
From the European perspective, the hope was that an aviation
agreement could be reached in early 2006 once the United
States clarified its position on control of airlines.2 9 On Novem-
ber 23, 2005, both the United States and the EU issued a joint
statement that referred to their meeting, which took place from
U.S. carriers in Latin American OD markets began to rise dramatically in the
1990s regardless of whether open skies existed. Id. The study also points out that
between 1990 and 1998, the U.S. flag market share between the United States
and South America jumped from 43.1% to 57.4%, while it climbed eight points
to 60.4% in Central America and Mexico. Id. Results of the study also indicate
that in 1998, South American airlines lost "more than 1.2 million passengers to
their U.S. competitors," while Central American and Mexican carriers lost 1.3
million. Id.
25 At a lecture delivered to the Royal Aeronautical Society, Montreal Branch,
on December 8, 2005, titled Air Transport Liberalization: Ideal or Ordeal, Mr. Shane
asserted that liberalization begets more liberalization, and that liberalization is
the classic good deal that will not go unpunished. SeeJeffrey Shane, Undersec'y
of Transp., Air Transport Liberalization: Ideal or Ordeal, Address Before the
Royal Aeronautical Society (Dec. 8, 2005).
26 Jeffrey Shane, supra note 22, at 80.
27 Martial Tardy, EU, U.S. Makes Substantial Progress on Open Skies, AVIATION
DAILY, Oct. 24, 2005, at 1.
28 Id.
29 EU Seeks US Aviation Agreement in 2006, AiR LETrER, Nov. 22, 2005, at 2.
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November 14th through the 18th, 2005, and stated that progress
was made toward the signing of an aviation pact between the two
parties that would authorize every EU and U.S. airline to fly be-
tween every city in the EU and every city in the United States
without restrictions on the number of flights, aircraft types, or
routes selected, and would also involve unrestricted rights to fly
beyond the EU and United States to points in third countries.3 0
Such an agreement would authorize every EU and every U.S.
airline to set fares freely in accordance with market demand and
to enter freely into cooperation agreements with other airlines,
including code sharing and leasing agreements. A precondition
to such flexibility is that there should be a fundamental commit-
ment to the highest standards of aviation safety and security.
II. THE ISSUES INVOLVED
Individual European States, which until 1987 were separately
charting their destinies and their carriers' fortunes in their op-
erations of international air services, showed an initial inclina-
tion to work towards collective interests by partially liberalizing
European pricing policy in 1987. In 1993, the European coun-
tries of the European Economic Community agreed to full liber-
alization of pricing and liberalization of market access to apply
on an intra-European basis. The culmination of the unification
of European air transport came in 1997 when the European
Union agreed to accord cabotage rights to carriers of the EU
member States within the Union.
The European Economic Community, which was an eco-
nomic union of States, had its genesis in the Treaty of Rome of
March 25, 1957,31 and became the European Union by virtue of
30 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S., EU REACH TENTATIVE AIR TRANSPORT PACT
(2005), http://european-union-news.newslib.com/story/33-2961563.
31 Air transport in the European Community is fundamentally regulated by
two treaties: the Treaty which establishes the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC Treaty) and the Treaty which establishes the European Economic
Community (EEC Treaty, now called the EC Treaty). The former, which was
signed in Paris in 1951, addresses issues related to the carriage of coal and steel
through the media of rail, road and inland waterways and as such is not directly
relevant to aviation. The latter, on the other hand, admits of issues relating to all
modes of transport in the carriage of persons and goods and is of some relevance
to aviation.
The EEC Treaty, which was signed in Rome on 25 March 1957, has at its core a
Common Transport Policy ("CTP") concept which is calculated to achieve the
fundamental purposes of the European Community. One of the most salient
features of the EEC Treaty is that the tasks of the Community are set out suc-
cinctly in Article 2 of the Treaty, which provides inter alia for the adoption of a
2007]
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the Treaty of Maastricht of February 1992, which was amended by
the Treaty of Amsterdam of October 1997. The EU is a monetary
union and not a political union as yet. It is founded on the basic
premise that there is no discrimination based on nationality.
The application of this premise to air transport can be trans-
lated to the fact that only nationally owned carriers of the EU
member States could be the subject of bilateral air-services
agreements negotiated by the Union with third countries. As
such, individual state members of the EU cannot separately ne-
gotiate bilateral air-services agreements with third countries on
issues of nationality, as member States have the obligation to
honor European Community law when they negotiate air ser-
vices with third countries. However, as the result of a decision
of the European Court of Justice handed down in November
2002, sovereign member States of the EU could not be deprived
of their power and right to conclude agreements with third
countries, due to the fact that the EU common free market only
applied to intra-community air transport.12
From a legal perspective, air carriers of the member states of
the EU cannot have a European nationality since the EU does
not have the sovereign status of a state. This notwithstanding,
the Council of Ministers of the EU has given the European
Commission 3 the mandate to negotiate with the United States
CTP as provided for in Article 3(1) of the Treaty. This provision is linked to
Article 74, which in turn provides that the objectives of the Treaty in relation to
issues of transportation would be pursued by State Parties within the parameters
of the CTP, which is established by the Council of Europe through secondary
legislation.
32 Henri Wassenbergh, Open Skies and a Global Common Air Traffic Market, JOUR-
NAL LUCHTRECHT, Dec. 2005, at 51, 53.
33 Two of the most important EU institutions are the Council of the European
Union and the European Commission (the other two being the European Parlia-
ment and the European Court of Justice. The Council of the European Union
contains ministers of the governments of each of the European Union member
states. It is sometimes referred to in official European Union documents simply
as the Council or the Council of Ministers (which will become its official name if
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is adopted). The Council has a
President and a Secretary-General. The President of the Council is a Minister of
the state currently holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union,
while the Secretary-General is the head of the Council Secretariat, chosen by the
member states by unanimity, providing general advice, qualified legal advice,
translation services, and impartial negotiation assistance. The Council of the Eu-
ropean Union should be distinguished from the European Council, which meets
four times a year in what is informally known as the European Summit (EU sum-
mit), and is a closely related but separate body, made up with the heads of state
and government of the member states, whose mission is to provide guidance and
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and other third countries, particularly to have such countries
accept the fact that carriers of member states of the EU are
"Community air carriers" established in the territory of the EU
irrespective of their national ownership.
European carriers would like the right to operate between the
EU and the United States from any point within the EU (which
would translate as a seventh freedom 4 right in operating from a
country other than the carrier's national territory) and extend
that service to points within the United States (which is the
eighth freedom 35 right or consecutive cabotage).36 EU carriers
also seek the right to own and control U.S. carriers and, there-
fore, operate air services between points in the United States,
which is identified in the context of air law as the ninth free-
dom 37 or "stand alone cabotage."38 In order to obtain these
rights, European carriers seek the abolition of ownership of U.S.
carriers by U.S. nationals so that they (European carriers) can
attract capital from international money markets and enter into
mergers and acquisitions of foreign carriers. 9 If this were al-
lowed by the United States (which is seemingly an impossibility
under current U.S. policy) European carriers would still have to
operate on the basis that they remain "Community carriers" by
their European ownership.
high level policy to the Council. It is also to be distinguished from the Council of
Europe, which is a completely separate international organization and not a Eu-
ropean institution.
The European Commission (formally the Commission of the European Com-
munities) is the executive body of the European Union. Alongside the European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, it is one of the three main
institutions governing the Union.
34 The seventh freedom of the air is the right or privilege in respect of sched-
uled international air services, granted by one State to another State, of trans-
porting traffic between the territory of the granting State, and any third State
with no requirement to include on such operation any point in the territory of
the recipient State (in other words, the service need not connect to or be an
extension of service to or from the home State of the carrier). See ICAO Doc.
9626, supra note 10, at 4.1-10.
35 The eighth freedom of the air is the right or privilege, in respect of sched-
uled international air services, of transporting cabotage traffic between two
points in the territory of the granting State on a service which originates or termi-
nates in the home territory of the foreign carrier or (in connection with the
seventh freedom of the air) outside the territory of the granting State. Id.
36 Id.
37 The ninth freedom of the air is the right or privilege of transporting cabo-
tage traffic of the granting State on a service performed entirely within the terri-
tory of the granting State. See id. at 4.1-10 to -11.
38 Id. at 4.1-11.
39 Bakes, supra note 21, at 76.
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U.S. carriers seek free access to London Heathrow and sev-
enth-freedom carriage within the EU for express carriers. In
broad terms, the U.S. interests are focused on turning the North
Atlantic aviation market into an open-skies area, giving rise to a
common international air traffic market untrammeled by any
conditions on market access, capacity. and pricing. This would,
of course, exclude the internal U.S. market and any incursion of
current U.S. policy on majority ownership of U.S. carriers by
U.S. nationals.
In reality, the United States has already acquired for its carri-
ers the rights to operate between European States through cur-
rent bilateral air-services agreements negotiated with individual
European States and as such, any demand by the United States
for fifth-freedom rights within the EU cannot be considered cab-
otage.4 ° As Wassenbergh correctly observes, in the absence of a
single, unified, sovereign EU airspace, the EU cannot consider
operations between sovereign states within the EU cabotage.4'
Nonetheless, the open-skies judgments of the European Court
of Justice4 2 of November 5, 2002, were to the effect that the
eight EU members, by concluding individual bilateral agree-
ments with the United States, had breached EC law in that the
individual nationality clauses in all agreements infringed the
right of establishment under Article 43 of the EC Treaty by dis-
40 See ICAO Doc. 9626, supra note 10, at 4.1-8.
41 Wassenbergh, supra note 36, at 55.
42 The European Court ofiustice (ECJ) is formally known as the Court ofJustice
of the European Communities (in other words, the court of the European Union
(EU)). It is based in Luxembourg, unlike most of the rest of the European Union
institutions, which are based in Brussels and Strasbourg. The ECJ is the Supreme
Court of the European Union. It adjudicates on matters of interpretation of Eu-
ropean law, most commonly: claims by the European Commission that a mem-
ber state has not implemented a European Union Directive or other legal
requirement; claims by member states that the European Commission has ex-
ceeded its authority; and references from national courts in the EU member
states asking the ECJ questions about the meaning or validity of a particular piece
of EC law. The Union has many languages and competing political interests, and
so local courts often have difficulty deciding what a particular piece of legislation
means in any given context. The ECJ steps in, giving its ruling which is binding
on the national court, to which the case will be returned to be disposed of. The
ECJ is only permitted to aid in interpretation of the law and cannot decide the
facts of the case itself. Individuals cannot bring cases to the ECJ directly. An
individual who is sufficiently concerned by an act of one of the institutions of the
European Union can challenge that act in a lower court, called the Court of First
Instance. An appeal on points of law lies against the decisions of the Court of First
Instance to the EC. See, e.g., Case C-467198, Comm'n v. Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. I-
9855.
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criminating on grounds of nationality." The ECJ also held that
the agreements infringed the exclusive external competence of
the European Commission. 4 The essence of the judgments was
that in areas where EC legislation affects third countries, only
the EU could enter into international commitments.45 The new
framework of EU air services negotiations is enshrined in Regu-
lation 847/2004, which allows the EC to exercise a "horizontal
mandate" to negotiate comprehensive agreements with third
countries.46 This means that the third country acknowledges
the existence of a single European market and the concomitant
fact that EU airlines can operate international flights from any
member state where they are established.
The European Council of Ministers' Conclusions ofJune 2005
introduce three lines of action: the EC could continue to bring
existing bilateral agreements between EU member states and
third countries into line with Community law through horizon-
tal agreements; the EC will establish a common aviation area
with neighboring countries by 2010; and global negotiations
with key partners would be opened.4 7 In this context, EU carri-
ers claim that their negotiations with the United States go be-
yond an open-skies regime, leading to total market opening and
regulatory convergence. The latter-regulatory convergence-
is calculated to establish a level playing field by increasing regu-
latory cooperation in the fields of competition policy, state aid,
aviation security, environmental protection, and safety.
The EU claims, with the advantage of a combined negotiating
power of twenty-five member states and a coherent framework
for industry within the EU, partners of the Union, such as the
United States, could gain unrestricted access to the EU market
and have legal security (through horizontal agreements),
achieved through a single negotiation.48 At the time of writing,
the EU was waiting for a final rule from the United States as to
whether the U.S. rule regarding ownership and control of U.S.
airlines would be aligned towards opening U.S. carriers to over-
43 See generally, Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, The Decision of the European Court of
Justice on Open Skies-How Can We Take Liberalization to the Next Level?, 68J. AIR L.
& COM., 485, 488-89 (2003).
44 Id. at 497-98.
45 Id. at 486-87.
46 Commission Regulation 847/2004, 2004 OJ. (L 157) 1.
47 See Communication from the Commission Developing the Agenda for the Community's
External Aviation Policy, at 1, COM (2005) 79 final (Mar. 11, 2005) [hereinafter
Communication].
4s Id. at 1.
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seas capital.4" One commentator has predicted that, should a
major U.S. carrier be threatened with Chapter 7 liquidation and
a European carrier were to offer investment in that carrier, the
United States may just be inclined to revisit their existing rules.5"
The above notwithstanding, and despite the slow pace of ne-
gotiation between the United States and the EU, both parties
have been vigorously forging liberal deals with third countries.
At the time of writing, the EC had negotiated and concluded
twenty-two horizontal agreements with third countries, while
fifty-nine countries had accepted community clauses. The EU
internal market had been recognized in 385 bilateral air-services
agreements. The EC had also established contact with major
partners such as China, Australia, India, and the Russian
Federation.5"
III. EFFECT OF OPEN SKIES ON COMPETITION
A. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
Whatever the outcome of the US/EU negotiations is in terms
of cabotage for EU carriers and the U.S. rule on ownership and
control of its carriers, it seems certain that the two parties could
agree on free market access between points in the United States
and points in the EU along with fifth-freedom rights. As a corol-
lary, free market access with no limitations on pricing and ca-
pacity would certainly open up competition between U.S. and
EU carriers.
Competition in the air transport industry is a complex pro-
cess, and there is no consensus among airline economists as to
the exact nature of the industry. The demand for air services,
particularly in the context of the airline passenger, is a contrived
demand emerging from other demands based on activities such
as business and leisure. This calls for a certain segmentation in
travel where, in business travel, the passenger does not usually
pay for the travel himself, whereas in leisure travel it comes out
of his own pocket. Therefore, the leisure market calls for a dif-
ferent kind of competition, primarily based on the fare, whereas
in business travel, although the fare is important, other consid-
49 Steven Lott, US/EU Agree on Text of Deal, Await Final Ownership Rule, AVIATION
DAILY, Nov. 21, 2005, at 2.
50 Baker, supra note 21, at 37.
51 Baker, supra note 21, at 37.
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erations, such as facilities on board, may also play a considerable
role in competition.52
One argument for the retention of regulation is that the very
nature of air transport, being either naturally monopolistic or
interdependently oligopolistic, calls for regulation in order that
fares are not arbitrarily raised and remain competitive. Another
theory in support of regulation is that some form of control
should be exercised over "mushroom" airlines that may sprout
up to exploit a liberalized market, thus disturbing the existing
balance of an integrated network. Of course, each route is a
separate market in itself and would require separate considera-
tion. Although principles of economies of scale may apply gen-
erally to airline competition, where a fact such as larger aircraft
being more efficient than smaller aircraft would apply on a gen-
eral basis, individual assumptions for different markets have
caused the two major aircraft manufacturers, Boeing and Airbus
Industry, to concentrate on manufacturing aircraft with
strengths in speed and capacity, respectively.
The European Union has expressed some concern as to the
possibility of having to face potential dangers stemming from
predatory pricing practices, particularly with regard to incum-
bent airlines dropping their prices in the short term to deter
new entrants. However, irrespective of the opening of market
access and liberalization of pricing and capacity between the
United States and EU, there is no room for doubt that neither
the United States nor the EU would allow an absolute "free for
all," as there are strict legal regimes against anticompetitive con-
duct and cutthroat practices in pricing in both jurisdictions.
The regulation of competition within the European Community
is governed by the EC Treaty.53 Two provisions in particular,
Articles 85 and 86, contain principles which outlaw anticompeti-
tive conduct. 54 While the former prohibits the prevention, re-
striction, or distortion of competition, the latter makes itself
applicable against abuse by one or more undertakings of a dom-
inant position within the market. 5 The former essentially con-
52 ORG. FOR ECON. CooP. & DEV. [OECD], DEREGULATION AND AIRLINE COMPE-
TITION 20-21 (1988).
53 The EC Treaty, also called the Treaty of Rome, was concluded in 1957 to
forge "an even closer union among the people of Europe." SeeJEFFREY GoH, Eu-
ROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT LAW AND COMPETITION 15 (John Wiley & Sons eds., 1997).
54 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 85-86,
Mar. 25, 1957, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 45 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
55 Id.
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tains provisions for agreements, decisions, or practices with
anticompetitive effects, and the latter concerns itself with abuses
of a dominant marketing position.56 The aim of these two provi-
sions is to preclude distortion of competition within the Com-
mon Market by supplementing the basic principles enshrined in
Articles 81 and 82 with substance.57 The goals of the Treaty in
general and Articles 85 and 86, which promote the free move-
ment of services, goods, persons, and capital whilst effectively
obviating barriers to trade within the community, is to enforce
some regulation.5" Both these provisions relate generally to all
sectors of transport unless explicitly excluded by the Treaty.59
Article 85 prohibits agreements that directly or indirectly fix
purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; limit
or control production, markets, technical development, or in-
vestment; share markets or sources of supply; apply dissimilar
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; and make
the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other par-
ties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or ac-
cording to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of those contracts. 60 These conditions are imposed on
agreements between undertakings, which are defined as inde-
pendent entities performing some economic or commercial
activity.61
Article 86 provides that any "abuse by one or more undertak-
ings of a dominant position within the common market or in a
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
Common Market insofar as it may affect trade between member
states.'62 The Article prohibits the following: direct or indirect
imposition of unfair purchase or selling prices or unfair trading
conditions; limitation of production, markets, or technical de-
velopment to the prejudice of consumers; application of dissimi-
lar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; and
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other par-




59 Case 167/73, Comm'n v. French Republic, 1974 E.C.R. 52.
60 EEC Treaty art. 85.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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cording to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts."
In implementing these two provisions, air carriers must not
assuming that a bloc exemption on air transport in the Treaty
pertaining to a particular issue, a related practice would be ex-
empt from the prohibitions contained in Articles 85 and 86.64
In the air transport section of the Treaty, it is abundantly clear
that block exemptions may apply only if abuse of dominant posi-
tion is not evident in a given transaction.65 Articles 85 and 86
are independent and complementary provisions and any ex-
emption under Article 85 will not necessarily render the provi-
sions of Article 86 nugatory.66 "Dominant position" was defined
in the 1979 decision of Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission67 as a po-
sition of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking that en-
ables it to prevent effective competition in the relevant market
by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors, its customers, and ultimately
of its consumers.68 Such a position may necessarily preclude
some competition except in monopoly or quasi-monopoly situa-
tions. There is every indication, from existing jurisprudence
and EC practice, that an assessment on an abuse of dominant
position would not be predicated upon one factor alone or sin-
gle characteristic, but would rather be anchored on numerous
factors such as market structure, barriers to entry, and conduct
of the business enterprise concerned.
In the United States, the term "antitrust laws" encompasses
federal and state legislation (statutes) which regulate competi-
tion with a view to wiping out unfair trade practices and preserv-
ing competition among sellers and buyers. Needless to say,
antitrust laws apply equally to international air services, and are
calculated to preclude both conduct and structural changes in
business enterprises. A typical example of conduct coming
under antitrust laws in the United States is a merger between
competitors which would unduly limit competition. These laws
are also meant to prevent producers or purchasers of goods
63 Id.
64 See id. arts. 85-86.
65 See BERNARDINE ADKINS, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW MONOLOGUE, AIR
TRANSPORT AND E.C. COMPETITION LAw 81 (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 1999).
66 Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing SA. v. Comm'n, 1990 E.C.R. 11-309.
67 Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. A.G. v .Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 6.
68 Id.
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from exercising a monopoly that imposes prices that signifi-
candy deviate from expected free market competition norms.
Antitrust legislation in the United States goes back to 1890
and the enactment of the Sherman Act, which makes it criminally
illegal for any contract, combination, or conspiracy to be
formed in restraint of trade.69 This all-encompassing legislation
prohibits price fixing, antidiscounting agreements, divisions of
markets by pooling agreements and capacity agreements, and
exchanges of information that can be considered as competi-
tively sensitive. y The Act also prohibits monopolies and con-
spiracy to monopolize in section two.?'
In 1914, the United States Congress legislated the Clayton Act,
primarily to supplement the Sherman Act.y2 The Clayton Act out-
laws certain types of "exclusive dealing" and "tied sales" and
prescribes standards for determining the legality of mergers and
acquisitions. 73 Both the Acts award compensation to persons in-
jured in their trade or business up to three times the amount of
their loss plus attorney fees.14 Courts have also permitted con-
sumer class actions in antitrust activity, allowing for significant
recovery of damages.
There is strong precedent against cutthroat pricing in the
United States, couched in the judgment of the 1993 Brooke
case, 75 which brings to bear U.S. regulation and judicial policy
on predatory practices in an oligopoly setting. The case in-
volved a competitor in the cigarette industry who sold his prod-
uct below cost, resulting in an action being brought by another
cigarette manufacturer under Article 2 of the Sherman Act.76
The Supreme Court held that for an action to succeed, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant's low prices are below an
appropriate level of the plaintiffs costs. 77 The fundamental
principle establishing the illegality of predation is that the
predator must ultimately be recouped by the act of predation. y
69 15 U.S.C § 1 (2006).
70 Id.
71 Id. § 2.
72 Id. § 13.
73 Id.
74 Id. §§ 1, 13.
75 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 222.
78 Id. at 224.
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The Court cited an earlier decision 79 and held that "recoup-
ment is the ultimate objective of an unlawful predatory pricing
scheme. It is a means by which a predator profits from preda-
tion. Without it ... consumer welfare is enhanced. ' 0 In both
the Brooke and Matsushita cases, the court found no recoupment
and therefore no justification to conclude that the defendants
had indulged in predation."
In a regulatory context, the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization ("ICAO"), in its role as the sole international regula-
tory body in the field of air transport, has issued clear policy and
guidance material on the avoidance or reduction of conflicts
over the application of competition laws to international air
transport.8 2 ICAO has issued these guidelines to address the
conflicts that may arise between states which adopt policies,
practices, and laws relating to the promotion of competition
and restraint of unfair competition within their territories.8 3
ICAO urges states to ensure that their competition laws, poli-
cies, and practices, and any application thereof to international
air transport are compatible with their obligations under rele-
vant international agreements.8 4 Within this guideline, there is
a strong recommendation for close consultation between states
and all interested parties in order that uniformity in practice be
achieved across borders to the maximum extent possible.8" Ac-
cordingly, when a state is adopting laws pertaining to competi-
tion, it is expected to give full consideration to views expressed
by any other state or states whose interests in international air
transport may be affected. 6 States are urged to give full regard
to principles of international comity, moderation, and re-
79 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
80 Brooke, 509 U.S. at 224.
81 The Areeda-Turner test defines criteria that determine predatory pricing.
See Hugo B. Roos & Niels W. Sneek, Some Remarks on Predatory Pricing and Monopo-
listic Competition in Air Transport, 22 AIR & SPACE L. 154, 154 (1997). According to
this test, a short run profit maximizing price as well as a price above full costs are
non-predatory. Id. The test also goes to consider that a price at or above reason-
ably anticipated short-run marginal costs is non-predatory. Id. Also, a price at or
above reasonably anticipated average variable cost should be considered to be
within legal limits. Id.
82 ICAO, Policy and Guidance Material on the Economic Regulation of International
Air Transport, at A2-2, ICAO Doc. 9587 (2d ed. 1999); see also ICAO, Manual on the
Regulation of Air Transport, at A5-1, ICAO Doc. 9626 (1st ed. 1996).
83 ICAO Doc. 9587, supra note 93, at A2-1.
84 Id.
85 See id. at A2-2.
86 Id.
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straint.8' The Guidelines also provide direction on dispute reso-lution and problem solving.88
B. COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
It is likely that an open-skies agreement between the United
States and EU will lead to increased competition resulting in a
wider range of services carried out with greater efficiency and at
competitive fares.89 The main effect of an open-skies agreement
between the United States and EU would be that London's
Heathrow Airport would be open to carriers other than the two
U.S. carriers-United Airlines and American Airlines-that are
currently allowed to fly there. It would also enable broader mar-
keting agreements between European and U.S. carriers and
help cargo airlines like FedEx and UPS build larger networks.
European carriers would have broader access to U.S. destina-
tions as well. In addition, when the travel and tourism industry
combined are contributing tremendously to the world economy,
an opening of two of the world's largest markets to open compe-
tition would lead to significant secondary effects in employment
opportunities. Compared to other regions, the air transport in-
dustry in Europe and North America makes the greatest contri-
bution to the world GDP.9° IATA records indicate that in 2004
North America accounted for 37% of global employment in avi-
ation (4.6 million in direct employment and 0.8 million em-
ployed as a result of the catalytic effect of such direct
employment) and 50% of the contribution of air-transport to
the global GDP.91 In comparison, Europe accounted for 27% of
global air-transport employment and GDP.92 The liberalization
of the US/EU air-transport market will undoubtedly open the
doors for both American and European carriers to have in-
87 Id.
88 Id. at A2-2 to -3.
89 A study conducted in 1986 by the Brookings Institution concluded that con-
sumers in the United States saved $6 billion annually in fares and the airline
industry experienced an average annual profit of $2.5 billion since domestic de-
regulation in 1978. See STEVEN MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, BROOKINGS INST.,
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC DEREGULATION 1-2 (1986).
9o AIR TRANSP. ACTION GROUP [ATAG], THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BENEFITS OF
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creased commercial arrangements, such as code sharing,9 3 that
would maximize the utilization of market potential both across
the Atlantic and beyond.94
The American version of "open skies" is conducive to open
competition as it comprises, inter alia, the basic elements of
open entry to all routes; unrestricted capacity and frequency on
all routes; unrestricted route, traffic rights, double disapproval
pricing in third and fourth freedom markets in intra-EC mar-
kets; liberal charter arrangements; liberal cargo regimes; open
code sharing opportunities; and explicit commitment on non-
discriminatory operation of access to computer reservation sys-
tems.95 Although in the nineties Europe thought this concept
of open skies and its elements would "endanger the whole pro-
cess of deregulation of Europe's civil aviation market,"96 the
overall approach of the EU to current negotiations with the
United States has been to accept the philosophy of the United
States on open skies. However, the scales would tip in favor of
the U.S. carriers under this philosophy, as they would be able to
consolidate fifth-freedom rights through a network of routes,
whereas the European carriers would not have a comparable va-
riety of points to exercise fifth-freedom rights beyond the
United States.
Another inhibitor for European carriers could be the antitrust
exigencies that could arise under U.S. law, which may put Euro-
pean carriers at a substantial disadvantage in the U.S. market9 7
For this and the more significant distinction between U.S. own-
93 One of the common uses of code sharing is to signify that two airlines con-
clude an arrangement according to which two or more connecting flights are
offered under a common designator code and flight number or those of both
airlines, although individual segments are operated with aircraft of one airline.
See R.I.R. ABEYRATNE, LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES OF COMPUTER RESERVATIONS
SYSTEMS AND CODE SHARING AGREEMENTS IN AIR TRANSPORT 119 (1995).
94 It will be recalled that, when the United States and the Netherlands entered
into what was the first open skies agreement between the United States and a
European country, KLM, who already had access to all U.S. points, consented to
the agreement on the condition that both parties accept the KLM/Northwest
alliance with antitrust immunity and mutual code sharing. By code sharing, KLM
could provide its "own" on-line services to U.S. points without operating services
itself. See Henri Wassenbergh, Common Market: Open Skies and Politics, 25 AIR &
SPACE L. 174, 176 (2000).
95 See Defining "Open Skies," D.O.T. Order No. 92-8-13, at App. 1 (1992).
96 Neil Kinnock, Undersec'y of Transp., Address Before the Association of Eu-
ropean Airlines (Apr. 28, 1995).
97 The Department of Transportation and Department ofJustice of the United
States review antitrust cases on a case-by-case basis. See Delta Airlines, D.O.T. Or-
der No. 96-5-26 (1996).
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ership and control restrictions (which are placed at 25% for for-
eign nationals) and leverage given to foreign nationals (49%) in
the EU, it would be structurally, economically, and legally more
advantageous to U.S. carriers to have an open-skies agreement
with Europe while their European counterparts may not be as
well placed under such an agreement. Therefore, an open-skies
agreement with EU mightjust help the American carriers in im-
proving their revenues, which have shown a $9.1 billion loss in
2004, followed by a $10 billion loss in 2005, and a projected $6.5
billion loss in 2006. In contrast, the European carriers have
shown profits in the triennium, with $0.6 billion in 2004, $1.3
billion in 2005, and a projected $0.6 billion in 2006.8
One of the commercial considerations with regard to achiev-
ing enhanced competition through an US/EU open-skies agree-
ment is the extent to which the EU will have the authority to
negotiate all aspects of the Department of Transportation stan-
dard open-skies agreement, which includes slots. Another is
whether individual EU member States could still, after the EU
signs an open-skies agreement with the United States, negotiate
a bilateral air-services agreement with the United States. From
the EU perspective, where the Council of Ministers has given a
mandate for the Commission to negotiate an agreement with
the United States, there is no express prohibition so long as
there is recognition of the EU as one single area and the Com-
munity clause is signed. The consequence of the European
Court of Justice, particularly from a competition angle, was that
the core element of the bilateral air-services agreement, which is
market access involving the award of air traffic rights, was un-
touched by the Court except in instances where an EU member,
in its agreement with the United States, explicitly precludes an-
other EU member from operating air services from that mem-
ber's territory.99 In other words, Belgium is not permitted to
agree that Air France will not or can not operate services be-
tween Brussels and New York. This prohibition is entrenched in
the Treaty of Rome, which forms the substance of legislative le-
gitimacy of the EU and incorporates the right of equal national
treatment for all EU member states." ° Therefore, if one EU
member state precludes the right of another member state's air-
line from operating air services to the United States from the
98 Mark Smyth & Brian Pearce, IATA, LATA Economics, Presentation Before
the ICAO (Jan. 24, 2006).
99 Case C-467198, Comm'n v. Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9855.
100 EEC Treaty art. 8.
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territory of the first EU state, it would be tantamount to discrim-
ination by the first state against the second state.
Also, the Court decided that certain specific provisions and
areas covered in the questioned bilateral agreements between
individual EU members and the United States were contrary to
EU law since they encroached upon internal EU regulations
pertaining to non-EU nationals. These laws concern the
following:
1. provisions pertaining to the allocation of airport slots;
2. provisions governing pricing, or fares and rates of intra-Euro-
pean air services;
3. agreements on computer reservation systems insofar as they
appear as provisions of the open skies agreements in question;
and $
4. provisions which reserved the right to grant permission under
the open skies agreements only to airlines substantially owned
and effectively controlled by nationals of the EU member State
that is party to a particular agreement."1
Yet another issue to be considered is the position of the
United States and the EU on the issue of public subsidies. This
extends both to carriers as well as to manufacturers. On the one
hand, one recalls the Anglo-French Concorde, which sustained
its services through subsidies by the British and French govern-
ments. 10 2 On the other hand, both parties are in dispute over
subsidies purportedly given to Boeing and Airbus by the United
States and EU, respectively. 10 3 Further impediments to competi-
tion under a US/EU open-skies regime could be the pervading
influence of national interest, where member States of the EU
must continue to ensure an "inside track" to their carriers,
which may include insistence that nationals of a country fly on
their national carrier;' 0 4 placement in a computer reservation
system where interested parties could give prominence in the
10, See, e.g., Denmark, id.
102 There are other instances, such as Alitalia, where the Italian government
saved the carrier by converting its debt into equity and the subsidies given by the
Scandinavian countries to SAS.
103 See Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The Airbus-Boeing Subsidies Dispute-Some Prelimi-
nary Legal Issues, 30 AIR & SPACE L. 379, 379 (2005).
104 Doganis cites the example where, under the "fly America Policy," officials
or others traveling on behalf of the U.S. government were and are required to fly
on U.S. airlines or U.S. carrier code-shared flights irrespective of open-skies
agreements applying to the sectors flown. RAGAS DOGANIs, THE AIRLINE BusINESS
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 45 (2001).
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system to their carriers; and the use of excessive user fees to dis-
courage foreign carriers.
As to whether there should be absolute, untrammeled compe-
tition within the Americas and between the Americas and Eu-
rope is a critical issue for the coming years. Of course, one
recent suggestion has been to crystallize a "convergence of regu-
latory principles" between Europe and the United States in com-
petition by establishing a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area
("TCAA"). This concept, suggested by the Association of Euro-
pean Airlines ("AEA") in a policy statement," 5 puts forward de-
tailed and realistic proposals on how to bring about an ideal
regulatory convergence between the European region and the
United States, addressing three areas:
1. matters in respect of which harmonization is necessary;
2. those in respect of which convergence could take the form of
mutual recognition; and




The TCAA concept advocates the freedom of the parties to pro-
vide services; addresses issues pertaining to airline ownership
and the right of establishment; provides recommendations with
regard to competition policy; and offers guidelines on the leas-
ing of aircraft. 07
Since the TCAA aims at replacing traditional governmental
regulatory control of such aspects of competition as market en-
try and pricing, the issues emerging from competition policy be-
come by far the most complex and difficult to deal with, within
the parameters of the TCAA.'0 8 Although the fundamental pos-
tulates of competition in Europe (as followed through by Euro-
pean Union regulations) and the United States are broadly
similar in intent, and both depend to a certain extent on the
application of extra-territoriality in their regulations, there are
obvious differences, such as those embodied in the different ap-
proaches to transatlantic airline alliances. 109 Also, the United
States stringently relies on a principle of "public interest" in its
air transportation policy, while European competition rules are
not as explicit in their policies.110 The basic essence of a TCAA
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would therefore establish the principle that matters of route
sharing, capacity, pricing, and frequency of services should be
driven by market forces rather than be determined by govern-
mental intervention. This way a certain commonality might be
established between air transports of the two regions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States has, over the past few decades, steadfastly
advocated the need for open-skies agreements with its partners
in aviation. 1 At the bilateral level, thirty-eight "open-skies" bi-
lateral air-services agreements have so far been concluded by
seventeen states or areas in the Asia Pacific region, with the
United States being one of the partners in twelve cases. With
Africa, the United States has concluded open-skies agreements
with sixteen African States. 1 2 While no U.S. carriers have been
directly serving Africa, they have expanded code-share services
with European carriers. Also, several African carriers inaugu-
rated services to the United States.
For its part, the EU has also made progress. That the Euro-
pean Commission has concluded horizontal agreements so far
with Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, all of which were
initialed in 2005.13 The European Commission has also asked
the Council of the EU to grant more comprehensive negotiating
mandates for the creation of open aviation areas with Australia,
China, and New Zealand.
With regard to Africa, the EU has achieved a significant level
of progress. One of the European Commission's negotiating
mandates conferred by the Council of the EU is to negotiate, on
behalf of all member states, a Euro-Mediterranean aviation
agreement with Morocco.1 14 This agreement was initialed in De-
cember 2005 and will eventually replace all the bilateral air-ser-
vices agreements between Morocco and the EU member
11 See Hearings, supra note 3.
112 The sixteen African states include the following: Tanzania (1999), Namibia
(2000), Burkina Faso (2000), Ghana (2000), The Gambia (2000), Nigeria (2000),
Morocco (2000), Rwanda (2000), Benin (2000), Senegal (2000), Uganda (2002),
Cape Verde (2002), Madagascar (2004), Gabon (2004), Ethiopia (2005), and
Mali (2005).
113 Air Transport Portal of the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/
transport/air-portal/international/pillars/horizontal agreements-en.htm (last
viewed Feb. 24, 2007).
114 Ass'n of European Airlines [AEA], EU Seeks to Extend Aviation Talks with Non-
EU States (Feb. 16, 2004).
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states."' The European Commission has also been conferred a
horizontal mandate to replace certain specific provisions in the
existing bilateral agreements declared contrary to Community
law. In response to the European Commission's negotiating
mandates, African ministers agreed in May, 2005, that it was nec-
essary to adopt a common external policy and recommended
carrying out a two-phase plan of action for this purpose.
As can be noted, irrespective of the difficulties arising from
the transition from a traditional and entrenched bilateral
method of negotiation, both the United States and EU have
forged ahead towards their goal of open skies with an impressive
list of precedent. The collective position of these two giants is
rife with complex realities of competition and cannot be com-
pared with other nations that might place open skies on a bilat-
eral negotiation table and consider it a done deal if the other
party accepts. Nor can the US/EU open their territories to un-
limited and untrammeled open skies. There has to be a sense of
where the two parties are headed when capacity, pricing, and
frequency are open. This direction should address the outcome
of open skies and the various exigencies that might follow, such
as complexities in slot allocation, national interest, possible car-
rier alliances, and secondary business stemming from open
skies.
All inhibitors to open skies, notwithstanding the overall bene-
fits of liberalization, must outweigh the consequences of protec-
tionism. As one commentator has stated, when all is said and
done, "every argument against open skies is an argument in
favor of protecting some airline or other against competition...
on the flip side of capacity dumping and predatory pricing you
find a smashing deal for the markets in and out of the country,
more business and tourist travelers, more goods moving by air,
hotels flourishing, the overall economy better off and every-
body's happy."'1 16 If the United States and the EU were to adopt
this philosophy, the negotiations would end with a "win-win"
deal.
115 Press Release, European Union, European Union Signs Aviation Agree-
ment with New Zealand (June 21, 2006).
116 Maurice Flanagan, Open Skies and the Survival of the Fittest, AEROSPACE, Au-
gust 1996, at 16, 18.
